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Frawley is correct to stress the importance of control in cognitive processing, and the essence of his 
proposal — that disorders of cognition can result from either within-module or between-module 
breakdown — is an interesting and potentially important contribution to cognitive science. However, 
Frawley’s commitment to an overly-literal interpretation of the computational metaphor, combined 
with his confusion over the possible relationship between any putative language of thought and 
modularity in peripheral versus central processes, distracts and detracts from his work. In particular, 
mental processes can employ a language of thought without that language being in any way similar to 
standard functional or procedural programming languages. In addition, communication between 
(peripheral) modules does not need to be bound by a single language. Furthermore, the absence of a 
plausible computational system within which to demonstrate the logic/control distinction and its 
consequences for the language disorders under discussion weakens the within-module/between-
module argument. 
 
The computational metaphor — that the brain is like a computer — may be accepted at any one of 
many different levels. At one extreme, one may accept merely that the functions computed by the 
neural hardware are subject to the constraints of computability theory. Thus, as Frawley notes, this 
view is consistent even with anti-representationalist dynamic systems theory (Port & van Gelder, 
1995). At the other extreme, one might conceive of the neural hardware as a glorified von Neumann 
machine that executes a program of instructions, and that may crash if any of those instructions 
embodies a false assumption (e.g., by referring to non-existent data or by attempting arithmetic 
operations with invalid operands). Frawley appears to opt for this second interpretation, but 
intermediate interpretations are possible, and arguably more desirable. 
 
Several difficulties with Frawley’s interpretation of the computational metaphor are apparent. First, it 
suggests that the neural hardware rigidly adheres to a predetermined instruction sequence. (Although 
that instruction sequence may contain conditional “if-then-else” statements, it remains a rigid 
instruction sequence.) Where does this sequence come from? Second, it begs the question of how an 
operating system complex enough to perform the necessary instruction following and allocation of 
cognitive and effective resources might have evolved within the neural hardware. Third, it raises the 
possibility of both program and operating system crashes, and the question of how the system might 
be rebooted. Finally, it limits our imagination with respect to non-standard operating systems and 
control mechanisms. In particular, it prevents us from considering operating systems and control 
mechanisms that are not subject to the previous three difficulties. 
 
A limited imagination is apparent in the view, implicit in section 2.1, that all programming languages 
are necessarily either functional or procedural. Plausible control mechanisms that fall into neither of 
these categories are conceivable, and such control mechanisms have been proposed within higher 
cognitive domains. Thus, production systems (Newell & Simon, 1972) have proved to be highly 
adequate in the modelling of problem solving behaviour. Their potential in other cognitive domains 
has been illustrated through the development of general cognitive architectures such as Soar (Laird, 
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1987; Newell, 1990) and ACT-R (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Lebiere, 
1998).  
 
Production systems do not employ linear programs in which control passes from one instruction to the 
next. Their behaviour is instead determined by a set of condition-action associations (corresponding to 
long-term knowledge) and a mechanism for selecting between competing associations when multiple 
associations apply. On the assumption that the mechanism for selecting between competing 
associations (which is fixed at the hardware level) is robust, they cannot crash. (In the absence of 
additional monitoring mechanisms they can, however, lapse into infinite loops or inactivity.) 
Furthermore, the issues of calling subroutines (and hence whether parameters are passed by value or 
by address) and of banishing GOTO statements do not arise. The argument here is not that neural 
processing implements a production system (though it might), but that the production system model of 
mental computation is superior to models based on standard functional or procedural computing 
languages. 
 
The rejection of standard functional or procedural computing languages for cognitive control does not 
imply that the issue of cognitive control cannot be informed by the structured programming movement 
in modern computer science. In particular, the putative functional modularity of cognitive systems 
shares much with the object-oriented approach to systems design (Cooper, 1995). Within this 
approach, complex systems are treated as collections of communicating “objects” with well defined 
and circumscribed functions. Objects (like modules) obey rules of information encapsulation, their 
operation is impenetrable, and they communicate and co-ordinate their activities through message 
passing. Communication and co-ordination effectively replace the standard programming concepts of 
logic and control. (Interestingly, one can also argue for the second tenant of the object-oriented 
approach — that each object is an instance or specialisation of some more generic object class. If 
nature were to have developed some generic mechanisms capable of computation, it would not be 
surprising if those generic mechanisms were not duplicated and used for a range of functions, with the 
different functions imposing different specialisations upon the mechanisms.) 
 
Modularity is not at odds with a production system approach (cf. Cooper, 1995). Separate modules 
may effectively correspond to independent production systems (or to other computing devices). The 
central issue is that of communication and co-ordination between modules. This does not, in principle, 
require a single mentalese: any language for communication between modules may be specialised for 
each inter-module link (Cooper, 1994). Note also that if one accepts the modularity hypothesis as 
outlined by Fodor (1983), then this only concerns peripheral processes. Fodor specifically argues that 
central processes are non-modular. The implications are that a single language of thought is required 
within central processes, that peripheral processes must communicate with central processes in that 
language, but that central processes may use different languages to pass information to different 
peripheral processes. 
 
This computationally more plausible view of the structure and function of cognitive processes does not 
conflict with Frawley’s analysis of SLI as effectively a within-module disorder and other linguistic 
disorders as between-module disorders. Rather, it presents a more convincing portrayal of Frawley’s 
primary distinction — that between logic and control in cognitive processes. 
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